We present a novel approach to fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) that dramatically improves performance and bases security on weaker assumptions. A central conceptual contribution in our work is a new way of constructing leveled fully homomorphic encryption schemes (capable of evaluating arbitrary polynomial-size circuits), without Gentry's bootstrapping procedure.
INTRODUCTION

Ancient History
Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [19, 8] allows a computationally powerful worker to receive encrypted data and perform arbitrarily-complex dynamically-chosen computations on that data while it remains encrypted, despite not having the secret decryption key. Until recently, all FHE schemes [8, 6, 20, 10, 5, 4] followed the same blueprint, namely the one laid out in Gentry's original construction [8, 7] .
The first step in Gentry's blueprint is to construct a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SWHE) scheme, namely an encryption scheme capable of evaluating "low-degree" polynomials homomorphically. Starting with Gentry's original construction based on ideal lattices [8] , there are by now a number of such schemes in the literature [6, 20, 10, 5, 4, 13] , all of which are based on lattices (either directly or implicitly). The ciphertexts in all these schemes are "noisy", with a noise that grows slightly during homomorphic addition, and explosively during homomorphic multiplication, and hence, the limitation of low-degree polynomials.
To obtain FHE, Gentry provided a remarkable bootstrapping theorem which states that given a SWHE scheme that can evaluate its own decryption function (plus an additional operation), one can transform it into a "leveled" 1 FHE scheme. Bootstrapping "refreshes" a ciphertext by running the decryption function on it homomorphically, using an encrypted secret key (given in the public key), resulting in a reduced noise.
Until very recently, SWHE schemes tend to be incapable of evaluating their own decryption circuits (plus some) without significant modifications. (We discuss recent exceptions [9, 3] below.) Thus, the final step is to squash the decryption circuit of the SWHE scheme, namely transform the scheme into one with the same homomorphic capacity but a decryption circuit that is simple enough to allow bootstrapping. Gentry [8] showed how to do this by adding a "hint" -namely, a large set with a secret sparse subset that sums to the original secret key -to the public key and relying on a "sparse subset sum" assumption.
Efficiency of Fully Homomorphic Encryption
The efficiency of fully homomorphic encryption has been a (perhaps, the) big question following its invention. In this paper, we are concerned with the per-gate computation overhead of the FHE scheme, defined as the ratio between the time it takes to compute a circuit homomorphically to the time it takes to compute it in the clear. 2 Unfortunately, FHE schemes that follow Gentry's blueprint (some of which have actually been implemented [10, 5] ) have fairly poor performance -their per-gate computation overhead is p(λ), a large polynomial in the security parameter. In fact, we would like to argue that this penalty in performance is somewhat inherent for schemes that follow this blueprint.
First, the complexity of (known approaches to) bootstrapping is inherently at least the complexity of decryption times the bit-length of the individual ciphertexts that are used to encrypt the bits of the secret key. The reason is that bootstrapping involves evaluating the decryption circuit homomorphically -that is, in the decryption circuit, each secretkey bit is replaced by a (large) ciphertext that encrypts that bit -and both the complexity of decryption and the ciphertext lengths must each be Ω(λ).
Second, the undesirable properties of known SWHE schemes conspire to ensure that the real cost of bootstrapping for FHE 1 In a "leveled" FHE scheme, the parameters of the scheme may depend on the depth of the circuits that the scheme can evaluate (but not on their size). One can obtain a "pure" FHE scheme (with a constant-size public key) from a leveled FHE scheme by assuming "circular security" -namely, that it is safe to encrypt the leveled FHE secret key under its own public key. We will often omit the term "leveled" in this work. 2 Other measures of efficiency, such ciphertext/key size and encryption/decryption time, are also important. In fact, the schemes we present in this paper are very efficient in these aspects (as are the schemes in [9, 3] ).
schemes that follow this blueprint is actually much worse than quadratic. Known FHE schemes start with a SWHE scheme that can evaluate polynomials of degree D (multiplicative depth log D) securely only if the underlying lattice problem is hard to 2 D -approximate. To achieve hardness against 2 λ time adversaries, the lattice must have dimension Ω(D · λ). This is because we have lattice algorithms in n dimensions that compute 2 n/λ -approximations of short vectors in time 2 O(λ) . Moreover, the coefficients of the vectors used in the scheme have bit length Ω(D) to allow the ciphertext noise room to expand to 2 D . Therefore, the size of "fresh" ciphertexts (e.g., those that encrypt the bits of the secret key) isΩ(D 2 · λ). Since the SWHE scheme must be "bootstrappable" -i.e., capable of evaluating its own decryption function -D must exceed the degree of the decryption function. Typically, the degree of the decryption function is Ω(λ). Thus, overall, "fresh" ciphertexts have sizeΩ(λ 3 ). So, the real cost of bootstrapping -even if we optimistically assume that the "stale" ciphertext that needs to be refreshed can be decrypted in only Θ(λ)-time -isΩ(λ 4 ). The analysis above ignores a nice optimization by Stehlé and Steinfeld [22] , which so far has not been useful in practice, that uses Chernoff bounds to asymptotically reduce the decryption degree down to O( √ λ). With this optimization, the per-gate computation of FHE schemes that follow the blueprint isΩ(λ 3 ). 
Recent Deviations from Gentry's Blueprint, and the Hope for Better Efficiency
Recently, Gentry and Halevi [9] , and Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [3] , independently found very different ways to construct FHE without using the squashing step, and thus without the sparse subset sum assumption. These schemes are the first major deviations from Gentry's blueprint for FHE. Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [3] manage to base security entirely on LWE (for sub-exponential approximation factors), avoiding reliance on ideal lattices.
From an efficiency perspective, however, these results are not a clear win over previous schemes. Both of the schemes still rely on the problematic aspects of Gentry's blueprint -namely, bootstrapping and an SWHE scheme with the undesirable properties discussed above. Thus, their pergate computation is still more thanΩ(λ 4 ). Nevertheless, the techniques introduced in these recent constructions are very interesting and useful to us. In particular, we use the tools and techniques introduced by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [3] in an essential way to achieve remarkable efficiency gains.
An important, somewhat orthogonal question is the strength of assumptions underlying FHE schemes. All the schemes so far rely on the hardness of short vector problems on lattices with a subexponential approximation factor. Can we base FHE on the hardness of finding a polynomial approximation? 3 We note that bootstrapping lazily -i.e., applying the refresh procedure only at a 1/L fraction of the circuit levels for L > 1 -cannot reduce the per-gate computation further by more than a logarithmic factor for schemes that follow this blueprint, since these SWHE schemes can evaluate only log multiplicative depth before it becomes absolutely necessary to refresh -i.e., L = O(log λ).
Our Results and Techniques
We leverage Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's techniques [3] to achieve asymptotically very efficient FHE schemes. Also, we base security on lattice problems with quasi-polynomial approximation factors. (Previous schemes all used sub-exponential factors.) In particular, we have the following theorem (informal):
• Assuming Ring LWE for an approximation factor exponential in L, we have a leveled FHE scheme that can evaluate L-level arithmetic circuits without using bootstrapping. The scheme hasÕ(λ·L 3 ) per-gate computation (namely, quasi-linear in the security parameter).
• Alternatively, assuming Ring LWE is hard for quasipolynomial factors, we have a leveled FHE scheme that uses bootstrapping as an optimization, where the pergate computation (which includes the bootstrapping procedure) isÕ(λ 2 ), independent of L.
We can alternatively base security on LWE, albeit with worse performance. We now sketch our main idea for boosting efficiency.
In the BV scheme [3] , like ours, a ciphertext vector c ∈ R n (where R is a ring, and n is the "dimension" of the vector) that encrypts a message m satisfies the decryption formula m = [ c, s ]q 2 , where s ∈ R n is the secret key vector, q is an odd modulus, and [·]q denotes reduction into the range (−q/2, q/2). This is an abstract scheme that can be instantiated with either LWE or Ring LWE -in the LWE instantiation, R is the ring of integers mod q and n is a large dimension, whereas in the Ring LWE instantiation, R is the ring of polynomials over integers mod q and an irreducible f (x), and the dimension n = 1.
We will call [ c, s ]q the noise associated to ciphertext c under key s. Decryption succeeds as long as the magnitude of the noise stays smaller than q/2. Homomorphic addition and multiplication increase the noise in the ciphertext. Addition of two ciphertexts with noise at most B results in a ciphertext with noise at most 2B, whereas multiplication results in a noise as large as B 2 . 4 We will describe a noise-management technique that keeps the noise in check by reducing it after homomorphic operations, without bootstrapping.
The key technical tool we use for noise management is the "modulus switching" technique developed by Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [3] . Jumping ahead, we note that while they use modulus switching in "one shot" to obtain a small ciphertext (to which they then apply Gentry's bootstrapping procedure), we will use it (iteratively, gradually) to keep the noise level essentially constant, while stingily sacrificing modulus size and gradually sacrificing the remaining homomorphic capacity of the scheme.
Modulus Switching
The essence of the modulus-switching technique is captured in the following lemma. In words, the lemma says that an evaluator, who does not know the secret key s but instead only knows a bound on its length, can transform a ciphertext c modulo q into a different ciphertext modulo p while preserving correctness -namely, [ c , s ]p = [ c, s ]q mod 2. The transformation from c to c involves simply scaling by 4 The noise after multiplication is in fact a bit larger than B 2 due to the additional noise from the BV "re-linearization" process. For the purposes of this exposition, it is best to ignore this minor detail.
(p/q) and rounding appropriately! Most interestingly, if s is short and p is sufficiently smaller than q, the "noise" in the ciphertext actually decreases -namely,
Lemma 1. Let p and q be two odd moduli, and let c be an integer vector. Define c to be the integer vector closest to (p/q) · c such that c = c mod 2. Then, for any s with Amazingly, this trick permits the evaluator to reduce the magnitude of the noise without knowing the secret key, and without bootstrapping. In other words, modulus switching gives us a very powerful and lightweight way to manage the noise in FHE schemes! In [3] , the modulus switching technique is bundled into a "dimension reduction" procedure, and we believe it deserves a separate name and close scrutiny. It is also worth noting that our use of modulus switching does not require an "evaluation key", in contrast to [3] .
Our New Noise Management Technique
At first, it may look like modulus switching is not a very effective noise management tool. If p is smaller than q, then of course modulus switching may reduce the magnitude of the noise, but it reduces the modulus size by essentially the same amount. In short, the ratio of the noise to the "noise ceiling" (the modulus size) does not decrease at all. Isn't this ratio what dictates the remaining homomorphic capacity of the scheme, and how can potentially worsening (certainly not improving) this ratio do anything useful?
In fact, it's not just the ratio of the noise to the "noise ceiling" that's important. The absolute magnitude of the noise is also important, especially in multiplications. Suppose that q ≈ x k , and that you have two mod-q SWHE ciphertexts with noise of magnitude x. If you multiply them, the noise becomes x 2 . After 4 levels of multiplication, the noise is x 16 . If you do another multiplication at this point, you reduce the ratio of the noise ceiling (i.e. q) to the noise level by a huge factor of x 16 -i.e., you reduce this gap very fast. Thus, the actual magnitude of the noise impacts how fast this gap is reduced. After only log k levels of multiplication, the noise level reaches the ceiling. Now, consider the following alternative approach. Choose a ladder of gradually decreasing moduli {qi ≈ q/x i } for i < k. After you multiply the two mod-q ciphertexts, switch the ciphertext to the smaller modulus q1 = q/x. As the lemma above shows, the noise level of the new ciphertext (now with respect to the modulus q1) goes from x 2 back down to x. (Let's suppose for now that 1(s) is small in comparison to x so that we can ignore it.) Now, when we multiply two ciphertexts (wrt modulus q1) that have noise level x, the noise again becomes x 2 , but then we switch to modulus q2 to reduce the noise back to x. In short, each level of multiplication only reduces the ratio (noise ceiling)/(noise level) by a factor of x (not something like x 16 ). With this new approach, we can perform about k (not just log k) levels of multiplication before we reach the noise ceiling. We have just increased (without bootstrapping) the number of multiplicative levels that we can evaluate by an exponential factor! This exponential improvement is enough to achieve leveled FHE without bootstrapping. For any polynomial L, we can evaluate circuits of depth L. The performance of the scheme degrades with L -e.g., we need to set q = q0 to have bit length proportional to L -but it degrades only polynomially with L.
Our main observation -the key to obtaining FHE without bootstrapping -is so simple that it is easy to miss and bears repeating: We get noise reduction automatically via modulus switching, and by carefully calibrating our ladder of moduli {qi}, one modulus for each circuit level, to be decreasing gradually, we can keep the noise level very small and essentially constant from one level to the next while only gradually sacrificing the size of our modulus until the ladder is used up. With this approach, we can efficiently evaluate arbitrary polynomial-size arithmetic circuits without resorting to bootstrapping.
In terms of performance, this scheme trounces previous FHE schemes (at least asymptotically; the concrete performance remains to be seen). Instantiated with ring-LWE, it can evaluate L-level arithmetic circuits with per-gate computationÕ(λ · L 3 ) -i.e., computation quasi-linear in the security parameter. Since the ratio of the largest modulus (namely, q ≈ x L ) to the noise (namely, x) is exponential in L, the scheme relies on the hardness of approximating short vectors to within an exponential in L factor.
Bootstrapping for Better Efficiency and Better Assumptions
In out FHE-without-bootstrapping scheme, the per-gate computation depends polynomially on the number of levels in the circuit that is being evaluated. While this approach is efficient (in the sense of "polynomial time") for polynomial-size circuits, the per-gate computation may become undesirably high for very deep circuits. So, we reintroduce bootstrapping as an optimization 5 that makes the per-gate computation independent of the circuit depth, and that (if one is willing to assume circular security) allows homomorphic operations to be performed indefinitely without needing to specify in advance a bound on the number of circuit levels. The main idea is that to compute arbitrary polynomial-depth circuits, it is enough to compute the decryption circuit of the scheme homomorphically. Since the decryption circuit has depth ≈ log λ, the largest modulus we need has only polylog(λ) bits, and therefore we can base security on the hardness of lattice problems with quasipolynomial factors. Since the decryption circuit has size O(λ) for the RLWE-based instantiation, the per-gate computation becomesÕ(λ 2 ) (independent of L). See Section 6 for details.
Other Optimizations
We also consider batching as an optimization. The idea behind batching is to pack multiple plaintexts into each ciphertext so that a function can be homomorphically evaluated on multiple inputs with approximately the same efficiency as homomorphically evaluating it on one input.
An especially interesting case is batching the decryption function so that multiple ciphertexts -e.g., all of the ciphertexts associated to gates at some level in the circuit -can be bootstrapped simultaneously very efficiently. For circuits of large width (say, width λ), batched bootstrapping reduces the per-gate computation in the RLWE-based instantiation toÕ(λ), independent of L. We give the details in Section 6.
Other Related Work
We note that prior to Gentry's construction, there were already a few interesting homomorphic encryptions schemes that could be called "somewhat homomorphic", including Boneh-Goh-Nissim [2] (evaluates quadratic formulas using bilinear maps), (Aguilar Melchor)-Gaborit-Herranz [15] (evaluates constant degree polynomials using lattices) and IshaiPaskin [12] (evaluates branching programs).
PRELIMINARIES
Basic Notation
In our construction, we will use a ring R. In our concrete instantiations, we prefer to use either R = Z (the integers) or the polynomial ring R = Z[x]/(x d +1), where d is a power of 2.
We write elements of R in lowercase -e.g., r ∈ R. We write vectors in bold -e.g., v ∈ R n . The notation v[i] refers to the i-th coefficient of v. We write the dot product
When R is a polynomial ring, r for r ∈ R refers to the Euclidean norm of r's coefficient vector. We say γR = max{ a · b / a b : a, b ∈ R} is the expansion factor of R. For R = Z[x]/(x d +1), the value of γR is at most √ d by Cauchy-Schwarz. (The canonical embedding [14] provides a better, tighter way of handling the geometry of cyclotomic rings. We instead use the expansion factor, defined above, for its simplicity, and since it suffices for our asymtotic results.)
For integer q, we use Rq to denote R/qR. Sometimes we will use abuse notation and use R2 to denote the set of R-elements with binary coefficients -e.g., when R = Z, R2 may denote {0, 1}, and when R is a polynomial ring, R2 may denote those polynomials that have 0/1 coefficients. We use R q,d when we also want to specify the degree of the polynomial associated to R. When it is obvious that q is not a power of two, we will use log q to denote 1 + log q . For a ∈ R, we use the notation [a]q to refer to a mod q, with coefficients reduced into the range (−q/2, q/2].
Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption
Most of this paper will focus on the construction of a leveled fully homomorphic scheme, in the sense that the pa-rameters of the scheme depend (polynomially) on the depth of the circuits that the scheme is capable of evaluating.
Definition 1 (Leveled FHE [7] ). We say that a family of homomorphic encryption schemes {E (L) : L ∈ Z + } is leveled fully homomorphic if, for all L ∈ Z + , they all use the same decryption circuit, E (L) compactly evaluates all circuits of depth at most L (that use some specified complete set of gates), and the computational complexity of E (L) 's algorithms is polynomial (the same polynomial for all L) in the security parameter, L, and (in the case of the evaluation algorithm) the size of the circuit.
The Learning with Errors (LWE) Problem
The learning with errors (LWE) problem was introduced by Regev [17] . It is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (LWE).
For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ) be an integer dimension, let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be an integer, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over Z. The LWEn,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from Z n+1 q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← Z n q uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ Z n+1 q by sampling ai ← Z n q uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = a, s + ei. The LWEn,q,χ assumption is that the LWEn,q,χ problem is infeasible.
Regev [17] proved that for certain moduli q and Gaussian error distributions χ, the LWEn,q,χ assumption is true as long as certain worst-case lattice problems are hard to solve using a quantum algorithm. We state this result using the terminology of B-bounded distributions, which is a distribution over the integers where the magnitude of a sample is bounded with high probability. A definition follows.
Definition 3 (B-bounded distributions).
A distribution ensemble {χn} n∈N , supported over the integers, is called B-bounded if
We can now state Regev's worst-case to average-case reduction for LWE.
Theorem 1 (Regev [17] ). For any integer dimension n, prime integer q = q(n), and B = B(n) ≥ 2n, there is an efficiently samplable B-bounded distribution χ such that if there exists an efficient (possibly quantum) algorithm that solves LWEn,q,χ, then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for solvingÕ(qn 1.5 /B)-approximate worst-case SIVP and gapSVP.
Peikert [16] de-quantized Regev's results to some extentthat is, he showed the LWEn,q,χ assumption is true as long as certain worst-case lattice problems are hard to solve using a classical algorithm. (See [16] for a precise statement of these results. ) Applebaum et al. [1] showed that if LWE is hard for the above distribution of s, then it is also hard when s's coefficients are sampled according to the noise distribution χ.
The Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) Problem
The ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem was introduced by Lyubaskevsky, Peikert and Regev [14] . We will use an simplified special-case version of the problem that is easier to work with [18, 4] .
) and let Rq = R/qR. Let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The RLWE d,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from R 2 q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← Rq uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ R 2 q by sampling ai ← Rq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = ai · s + ei. The RLWE d,q,χ assumption is that the RLWE d,q,χ problem is infeasible.
The RLWE problem is useful, because the well-established shortest vector problem (SVP) over ideal lattices can be reduced to it, specifically:
there is an efficiently samplable distribution χ that outputs elements of R of length at most B with overwhelming probability, such that if there exists an efficient algorithm that solves RLWE d,q,χ , then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for solving d ω(1) · (q/B)-approximate worst-case SVP for ideal lattices over R.
Typically, to use RLWE with a cryptosystem, one chooses the noise distribution χ according to a Gaussian distribution, where vectors sampled according to this distribution have length only poly(d) with overwhelming probability. This Gaussian distribution may need to be "ellipsoidal" for certain reductions to go through [14] . It has been shown for RLWE that one can equivalently assume that s is alternatively sampled from the noise distribution χ [14].
The General Learning with Errors (GLWE) Problem
The learning with errors (LWE) problem and the ring learning with errors (RLWE) problem are syntactically identical, aside from using different rings (Z versus a polynomial ring) and different vector dimensions over those rings (n = poly(λ) for LWE, but n is constant -namely, 1 -in the RLWE case). To simplify our presentation, we define a "General Learning with Errors (GLWE)" Problem, and describe a single "GLWE-based" FHE scheme, rather than presenting essentially the same scheme twice, once for each of our two concrete instantiations.
Definition 5 (GLWE). For security parameter
and Rq = R/qR, and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The GLWE n,f,q,χ problem is to distinguish the following two distributions: In the first distribution, one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from R n+1 q . In the second distribution, one first draws s ← R n q uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ R n+1 q by sampling ai ← R n q uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi = ai, s + ei. The GLWE n,f,q,χ assumption is that the GLWE n,f,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is simply GLWE instantiated with d = 1. RLWE is GLWE instantiated with n = 1. Interestingly, as far as we know, instances of GLWE between these extremes have not been explored. One would suspect that GLWE is hard for any (n, d) such that n · d = Ω(λ log(q/B)), where B is a bound (with overwhelming probability) on the length of elements output by χ. For fixed n · d, perhaps GLWE gradually becomes harder as n increases (if it is true that general lattice problems are harder than ideal lattice problems), whereas increasing d is probably often preferable for efficiency.
If q is much larger than B, the associated GLWE problem is believed to be easier (i.e., there is less security). Previous FHE schemes required q/B to be sub-exponential in n or d to give room for the noise to grow as homomorphic operations (especially multiplication) are performed. In our FHE scheme without bootstrapping, q/B will be exponential in the number of circuit levels to be evaluated. However, since the decryption circuit can be evaluated in logarithmic depth, the bootstrapped version of our scheme will only need q/B to be quasi-polynomial, and we thus base security on lattice problems for quasi-polynomial approximation factors.
By the GLWE assumption, the distribution {(ai, ai, s + t · ei)} is computational indistinguishable from uniform for any t relatively prime to q. This fact will be convenient for encryption, where, for example, a message m may be encrypted as (a, a, s + 2e + m), and this fact can be used to argue that the second component of this message is indistinguishable from random.
(LEVELED) FHE WITHOUT BOOTSTRAP-PING: OUR CONSTRUCTION
The plan of this section is to present our leveled FHEwithout-bootstrapping construction in modular steps. First, we describe a plain GLWE-based encryption scheme with no homomorphic operations. Next, we describe variants of the "relinearization" and "dimension reduction" techniques of [3] . Finally, in Section 3.4, we lay out our construction of FHE without bootstrapping.
Basic Encryption Scheme
We begin by presenting a basic GLWE-based encryption scheme with no homomorphic operations. Let λ be the security parameter, representing 2 λ security against known attacks. (λ = 100 is a reasonable value.)
Let R = R(λ) be a ring. For example, one may use R = Z if one wants a scheme based on (standard) LWE, or one may
is a power of 2 if one wants a scheme based on RLWE. Let the "dimension" n = n(λ), an odd modulus q = q(λ), and a "noise" distribution χ = χ(λ) over R be additional parameters of the system. These parameters come from the GLWE assumption. For simplicity, assume for now that the plaintext space is R2 = R/2R, though larger plaintext spaces are certainly possible.
We go ahead and stipulate here -even though it only becomes important when we introduce homomorphic operations -that the noise distribution χ is set to be as small as possible. Specifically, to base security on LWE or GLWE, one must use (typically Gaussian) noise distributions with deviation at least some sub-linear function of d or n, and we will let χ be a noise distribution that barely satisfies that requirement. To achieve 2 λ security against known lattice attacks, one must have n · d = Ω(λ · log(q/B)) where B is a bound on the length of the noise. Since n or d depends logarithmically on q, and since the distribution χ (and hence B) depends sub-linearly on n or d, the distribution χ (and hence B) depends sub-logarithmically on q. This dependence is weak, and one should think of the noise distribution as being essentially independent of q.
Here is a basic GLWE-based encryption scheme with no homomorphic operations. It uses the plaintext space R2, but it is easy to generalize it to plaintext spaces Rp, p > 2. It uses an integer parameter N = n · polylog(q) that we will discuss in detail following the description of the scheme.
Basic GLWE-Based Encryption Scheme:
Use the bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine whether we are setting parameters for a LWE-based scheme (where d = 1) or a RLWE-based scheme (where n = 1). Choose a µ-bit modulus q and choose the parameters d = d(λ, µ, b), n = n(λ, µ, b), and χ = χ(λ, µ, b) appropriately to ensure that the scheme is based on a GLWE instance that achieves 2 λ security against known attacks. Let R = Z[x]/(x d + 1) and let params = (q, d, n, N, χ).
• E.SecretKeyGen(params):
• E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk): Takes • E.Dec(params, sk, c):
Correctness is easy to see, and it is straightforward to base security on special cases (depending on the parameters) of the GLWE assumption (and one can find such proofs of special cases in prior work). To sketch the main ideas, first note that if an attacker can distinguish the public key A from a uniformly random matrix over R N ×(n+1) q , then the attacker can be used to solve the GLWE problem (for specific parameters). Therefore, assuming the GLWE problem is hard, an attacker cannot efficiently distinguish. Second, if A was indeed chosen uniformly from R N ×(n+1) q , the encryption procedure generates ciphertexts that are statistically independent from m (by the leftover hash lemma), and therefore the attacker has negligible advantage in guessing m.
For the LWE case, it suffices to take N > 2n log q [17] . For RLWE, it does not necessarily work just to take N > 2n log q = 2 log q due to subtle distributional issues -in particular, the problem is that Rq may have many zero divisors. Micciancio's regularity lemma [?] assures us that if A ∈ R N ×(n+1) q and r ∈ R N 2 are uniform, then A T r has negligible statistical distance from uniform when N = log(q · λ ω(1) ). Lyubashevsky et al. [14] (full version of the paper) give a stronger result when all of the ring elements in the matrix A are in R * q (non-zero-divisors) -namely, the distribution is within 2
−Ω(d) of uniform when the ring elements in the r are chosen from a discrete Gaussian distribution of width dq 1/N . (Using this result would necessitate some changes to the encryption scheme above.)
While we think our description of encryption above is useful in that it highlights the high-level similarity of LWE and RLWE, the distributional issues discussed above make it more desirable, in practice, to use a slightly different approach to encryption in the RLWE setting. In particular, Lyubashevsky et al. [14] streamline public key generation and encryption in the RLWE setting as follows:
• E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk): As above, except N = 1.
• E.Enc(params, pk, m): To encrypt a message m ∈ R2, set m ← (m, 0) ∈ R 2 q , sample r ← χ and e ← χ 2 . Output the ciphertext c ← m+2·e+A
q is the sum of m, a small even vector, and r (a small ring element) times the single encryption of zero given in the public key (namely A T ).
The security of LPR encryption relies on RLWE: assuming RLWE, if A T were uniform in R 2 q , then the two ring elements m + a1 · r + e1 and a2 · r + e2 of the ciphertext generated during encryption are pseudorandom.
Below, sometimes other functions will invoke the function E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk, N ) with an integer parameter N . In that case, it invokes the first version of E.PublicKeyGen (not the LPR version) with the specified value of N .
Key Switching (Dimension Reduction)
We start by reminding the reader that in the basic GLWEbased encryption scheme above, the decryption equation Suppose now that we have two ciphertexts c1 and c2, encrypting m1 and m2 respectively under the same secret key s. The way homomorphic multiplication is accomplished in [3] is to consider the quadratic equation
. Assuming the noises of the initial ciphertexts are small enough, we obtain m1 · m2 = [Qc 1 ,c 2 (s)]q]2, as desired. If one wishes, one can view Qc 1 ,c 2 (x) as a linear equation L long c 1 ,c 2 (x ⊗ x) over the coefficients of x ⊗ xthat is, the tensoring of x with itself -where x ⊗ x's dimension is roughly the square of x's. Using this interpretation, the ciphertext represented by the coefficients of the linear equation L long is decryptable by the long secret key s1 ⊗ s1 via the usual dot product. Of course, we cannot continue increasing the dimension like this indefinitely and preserve efficiency.
Thus, Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan convert the long ciphertext represented by the linear equation L long and decryptable by the long tensored secret key s1 ⊗ s1 into a shorter ciphertext c2 that is decryptable by a different secret key s2. (The secret keys need to be different to avoid a "circular security" issue). Encryptions of s1 ⊗ s1 under s2 are provided in the public key as a "hint" to facilitate this conversion.
We observe that Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's relinearization / dimension reduction procedures are actually quite a bit more general. They can be used to not only reduce the dimension of the ciphertext, but more generally, can be used to transform a ciphertext c1 that is decryptable under one secret key vector s1 to a different ciphertext c2 that encrypts the same message, but is now decryptable under a second secret key vector s2. The vectors c2, s2 may not necessarily be of lower degree or dimension than c1, s1.
Below, we review the concrete details of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's key switching procedures. The procedures will use some subroutines that, given two vectors c and s, "expand" these vectors to get longer (higher-dimensional) vectors c and s such that c , s = c, s mod q. We describe these subroutines first.
• BitDecomp(x ∈ R n q , q) decomposes x into its bit representation. Namely, write x = log q j=0
If one knows a priori that x has coefficients in [0, B] for B q, then BitDecomp can be optimized in the obvious way to output a shorter decomposition in R n· log B 2 . Observe that:
Lemma 2. For vectors c, s of equal length, we have
Proof. Trivial.
We remark that this obviously generalizes to decompositions with respect to bases other than the powers of 2. Now, key switching consists of two procedures: first, a procedure SwitchKeyGen(s1, s2, n1, n2, q), which takes as input the two secret key vectors, the respective dimensions of these vectors, and the modulus q, and outputs some auxiliary information τs 1 →s 2 that enables the switching; and second, a procedure SwitchKey(τs 1 →s 2 , c1, n1, n2, q), that takes this auxiliary information and a ciphertext encrypted under s1 and outputs a new ciphertext c2 that encrypts the same message under the secret key s2. (Below, we often suppress the additional arguments n1, n2, q.)
Note that, in SwitchKeyGen, the matrix A basically consists of encryptions of 0 under the key s2. Then, pieces of the key s1 are added to these encryptions of 0. Thus, in some sense, the matrix B consists of encryptions of pieces of s1 (in a certain format) under the key s2. We now establish that the key switching procedures are meaningful, in the sense that they preserve the correctness of decryption under the new key.
Lemma 3.
[Correctness] Let s1, s2, q, A, B = τs 1 →s 2 be as in SwitchKeyGen(s1, s2), and let A · s2 = 2e2 ∈ R N q . Let c1 ∈ R n 1 q and c2 ← SwitchKey(τs 1 →s 2 , c1). Then,
Note that the dot product of BitDecomp(c1) and e2 is small, since BitDecomp(c1) is in R N 2 . Overall, we have that c2 is a valid encryption of m under key s2, with noise that is larger by a small additive factor.
Again, the processes above are adapted to the plaintext space R2, but are easy to generalize.
Modulus Switching
.g., to a smaller number -while preserving the correctness of decryption under the same secret key! The essence of this modulus switching idea, a variant of Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan's modulus reduction technique, is formally captured in Lemma 4 below. Definition 6 (Scale). For integer vector x and integers q > p > m, we define x ← Scale(x, q, p, r) to be the R-vector closest to (p/q) · x that satisfies x = x mod r.
Definition 7 (
(R) 1 norm). The (usual) norm 1(s) over the reals equals i s[i] . We extend this to our ring R as follows:
Lemma 4. Let d be the degree of the ring (e.g., d = 1 when R = Z). Let q > p > r be positive integers satisfying q = p = 1 mod r. Let c ∈ R n and c ← Scale(c, q, p, r).
The lemma implies that an evaluator, who does not know the secret key but instead only knows a bound on its length, can potentially transform a ciphertext c that encrypts m under key s for modulus q -i.e., m =
Amazingly, assuming p is smaller than q and s has coefficients that are small in relation to q, this trick permits the evaluator to reduce the magnitude of the noise without knowing the secret key! (Of course, this is also what Gentry's bootstrapping transformation accomplishes, but in a much more complicated way.)
(Leveled) FHE Based on GLWE without Bootstrapping
We now present our FHE scheme. Given the machinery that we have described in the previous subsections, the scheme itself is remarkably simple.
In our scheme, we will use a parameter L indicating the number of levels of arithmetic circuit that we want our FHE scheme to be capable of evaluating. Note that this is an exponential improvement over prior schemes, that would typically use a parameter d indicating the degree of the polynomials to be evaluated.
(Note: the linear polynomial L long , used below, is defined in Section 3.2.) Our FHE Scheme without Bootstrapping:
Takes as input the security parameter, a number of levels L, and a bit b. Use the bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine whether we are setting parameters for a LWE-based scheme (where d = 1) or a RLWEbased scheme (where n = 1). Let µ = µ(λ, L, b) = θ(log λ + log L) be a parameter that we will specify in detail later. For j = L (input level of circuit) to 0 (output level), run params j ← E.Setup(1 λ , 1 (j+1)·µ , b) to obtain a ladder of parameters, including a ladder of decreasing moduli from qL ((L + 1) · µ bits) down to q0 (µ bits). (The ring degree dj, dimension nj, and noise distribution χj do not necessarily need to vary (decrease) with the circuit level. In the procedure below, we allow nj and χj to vary, but defer the case of decreasing dj to Section 4.)
• FHE.KeyGen({params j }): For j = L down to 0, do the following: 1. Run sj ← E.SecretKeyGen(params j ) and Aj ← E.PublicKeyGen(params j , sj).
. That is, s j is a tensoring of sj with itself whose coefficients are each the product of two coefficients of sj in Rq j . 3. Run τ s j+1 →s j ← SwitchKeyGen(s j+1 , sj). (Omit this step when j = L.)
The secret key sk consists of the sj's and the public key pk consists of the Aj's and τ s j+1 →s j 's.
• FHE.Enc(params, pk, m): Take a message in R2. Run E.Enc(params L , AL, m).
• FHE.Dec(params, sk, c): Suppose the ciphertext is under key sj. Run E.Dec(params j , sj, c). (The ciphertext could be augmented with an index indicating which level it belongs to.)
• FHE.Add(pk, c1, c2): Takes • FHE.Refresh(c, τ s j →s j−1 , qj, qj−1): Takes a ciphertext encrypted under s j , the auxiliary information τ s j →s j−1 to facilitate key switching, and the current and next moduli qj and qj−1. Do the following:
1. Switch Keys: Set c1 ← SwitchKey(τ s j →s j−1 , c, qj), a ciphertext under the key sj−1 for modulus qj.
2. Switch Moduli: Set c2 ← Scale(c1, qj, qj−1, 2), a ciphertext under the key sj−1 for modulus qj−1.
Remark 1. We mention the obvious fact that, since addition increases the noise much more slowly than multiplication, one does not necessarily need to refresh after additions, even high fan-in ones.
The key step of our new FHE scheme is the Refresh procedure. If the modulus qj−1 is chosen to be smaller than qj by a sufficient multiplicative factor, then Corollary 1 implies that the noise of the ciphertext output by Refresh is smaller than that of the input ciphertext -that is, the ciphertext will indeed be a "refreshed" encryption of the same value. We elaborate on this analysis in the next section.
One can reasonably argue that this scheme is not "FHE without bootstrapping" since τ s j →s j−1 can be viewed as an encrypted secret key, and the SwitchKey step can viewed as a homomorphic evaluation of the decryption function. We prefer not to view the SwitchKey step this way. While there is some high-level resemblance, the low-level details are very different, a difference that becomes tangible in the much better asymptotic performance. To the extent that it performs decryption, SwitchKey does so very efficiently using an efficient (not bit-wise) representation of the secret key that allows this step to be computed in quasi-linear time for the RLWE instantiation, below the quadratic lower bound for bootstrapping. Certainly SwitchKey does not use the usual ponderous approach of representing the decryption function as a boolean circuit to be traversed homomorphically. Another difference is that the SwitchKey step does not actually reduce the noise level (as bootstrapping does); rather, the noise is reduced by the Scale step.
TRADING OFF DEGREE FOR DIMEN-SION IN GLWE
The definition of a leveled FHE scheme requires the complexity of the decryption circuit to be independent of L, the number of levels the leveled FHE scheme can evaluate. This required property is not superfluous. With this property, it is easy to argue that, assuming circular security, we can use bootstrapping to convert a leveled FHE into a "pure" FHE scheme whose parameters are independent of levels; without this property, such a conversion may still be possible, but the argument is less immediate.
In the LWE setting, the parameters n0, q0 and bound Bχ 0 on the distribution χ0 can all be chosen independently of L, the number of levels the leveled FHE scheme can evaluate. Consequently, the (final) ciphertext length and decryption complexity (at level 0) do not depend on L, and we therefore have a leveled FHE scheme based on LWE.
Unfortunately, in the RLWE setting, things are not so simple. For security reasons, the dimension dj of the ring used at level j must grow linearly with the bit-length of qj, which (as we will see) grows at least linearly in j. Therefore, if we use a fixed ring throughout, we cannot claim that the (final) ciphertext length and decryption complexity (at level 0) are independent of L. Until we address this issue, we do not have a leveled FHE scheme without bootstrapping based on RLWE. The question arises: is there a way to reduce the dimension of the ring as we progress through the circuit?
Techniques
Here, we show that there is an interplay between the dimension n of a GLWE problem and the degree d of the modulus polynomial. We show that an GLW E n,x d +1,q,χ ciphertext can be efficiently broken into two GLW E 2n,x d/2 +1,q,χ ciphertexts.
We slightly deviate from the notation in the body of the paper and denote use GLWE n,d,q,χ to denote GLWE n,x d +1,q,χ (recall that d is always a power of 2). We further denote
. We begin by presenting a formal decomposition of elements from R q,d into elements of R q,d/2 . We show that each element a = a(x) ∈ R q,d can be represented using a (even) , a (odd) ∈ R q,d/2 . Recalling that an element in R q,d is a polynomial with d coefficients over Zq, the task seems very simple. We embed half of the coefficients of the polynomial a as coefficients of a (even) and the other half as coefficients of a (odd) . However, in order to preserve an algebraic structure over the the new elements, it is critical that the coefficients are divided between them in a special way.
Specifically, we define a (even) , a (odd) to be the elements of
In other words, a (even) assumes the even coefficients of a, and a (odd) the odd ones. To see that the algebraic properties are preserved, suppose we have an equation c(x) = a(x)·b(x) over R q,d , then it holds that
Noting that the parity of a power of x cannot change by reducing modulo x d + 1 (since d is a power of 2 and thus always even), it follows that we can separate odd and even powers in the expression above:
The equations above are still over the ring R q,d . In order to switch down to the ring R q,d/2 , we consider the following fact. In general, if w(
e., modulo q and x d + 1 -then it holds that w(x) = u(x) · v(x) over R q,d/2 -i.e., modulo q and x d/2 + 1. This follows syntactically by replacing x 2 everywhere with x. Therefore, we have that the following holds over R q,d/2 :
Suppose that we have a ciphertext vector c ∈ R 
We therefore have two ciphertexts, one that encrypts m under secret key (s (odd) , s (even) ). In fact, by a simple reordering of the ring elements within the second ciphertext, the two ciphertexts are made to be under the same secret key (s (even) , s (odd) ). Assuming the hardness of GLWE n,d/2,q,χ , we can use key switching to reduce the dimension of these ciphertexts from 2n + 2 to n + 1.
It should clear that, when d is a power of 2, our observations for moving from a GLWE n,d,q,χ ciphertext to two GLWE 2n,d/2,q,χ ciphertexts can be generalized to move from a GLWE n,d,q,χ ciphertext to 2 k GLWE 2 k n,d/2 k ,q,χ ciphertexts for any 2 k up to d. Observe that, if we only encode messages in the even coefficients from the beginning, and encode the associated m (odd) 's as zeroes, then the m (odd) 's are zeroes throughout the intermediates stages of the computation, and we obtain the final output message as the m (even) of the final ciphertext. In particular, the second ciphertext can be ignored, and therefore does not affect decryption complexity.
With this technique, we achieve leveled FHE with no bootstrapping based on RLWE. The decryption complexity of the
is independent of the homomorphic capacity L of the leveled FHE scheme. Of course, for this magic to work, we need GLWE n j ,d j ,q j ,χ j to be a hard problem for all j.
Generalizations
We suspect that our techniques can be extended to subfields of cyclotomics other than x 2 k + 1, but we leave this for future work.
CORRECTNESS, SETTING THE PARAM-ETERS, PERFORMANCE, AND SECURITY
Here, we will show how to set the parameters of the scheme so that the scheme is correct. Mostly, this involves analyzing each of the steps within FHE.Add and FHE.Mult -namely, the addition or multiplication itself, and then the SwitchKey and Scale steps that make up FHE.Refresh -to establish that the output of each step is a decryptable ciphertext with bounded noise. This analysis will lead to concrete suggestions for how to set the ladder of moduli and to asymptotic bounds on the performance of the scheme.
Let us begin by considering how much noise FHE.Enc introduces initially. Throughout, Bχ denotes a bound such that R-elements sampled from the the noise distribution χ have length at most Bχ with overwhelming probability.
The Initial Noise from FHE.Enc
Recall that FHE.Enc simply invokes E.Enc for suitable parameters (params L ) that depend on λ and L. In turn, the noise of ciphertexts output by E.Enc depends on the noise of the initial "ciphertext(s)" (the encryption(s) of 0) implicit in the matrix A output by E.PublicKeyGen, whose noise distribution is dictated by the distribution χ.
Lemma 5. Let q, d, n, N be the parameters associated to FHE.Enc. Let γR be the expansion factor associated to R. (γR and d are both 1 in the LWE case R = Z.) The length of the noise in ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc is at most
Proof. We have A · s = 2e where s ← E.SecretKeyGen, A ← E.PublicKeyGen(s, N ), and e ← χ N . Recall that encryption works as follows: c ← m + A T r mod q where r ∈ R N 2 . We have that the noise of this ciphertext is [ c, s ]q = [m + 2 r, e ]q. The magnitude of this element is at most
One can easily obtain a similar small bound on the noise of ciphertexts output by LPR encryption in the RLWE setting: a small polynomial in the security parameter λ, L, and log q.
The correctness of decryption for ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc, assuming the noise bound above is less than q/2, follows directly from the correctness of the basic encryption and decryption algorithms E.Enc and E.Dec. 
Correctness and
That is, correctness is preserved as long as this noise does not wrap modulo qj.
The correctness of FHE.Add and FHE.Mult, before the FHE.Refresh step is performed, is formally captured in the following lemmas.
Lemma 6. Let c1 and c2 be two ciphertexts under key sj for modulus qj, where
Let s j = sj ⊗ sj, where the "non-quadratic coefficients" of s j (namely, the '1' and the coefficients of sj) are placed first. Let c = c1 + c2, and pad c with zeros to get a vector c3 such that c3, s j = c , sj . The noise [ c3, s j ]q j has length at most 2B. If 2B < qj/2, c3 is an encryption of m1 + m2 under key s j for modulus qj -i.e., m1 The computation needed to compute the tensored ciphertext c3 isÕ(djn 2 j log qj). For the RLWE instantiation, since nj = 1 and since (as we will see) dj (resp. log qj) depend only quasi-linearly (resp. logarithmically) on the security parameter and linearly (resp. linearly) on L, the computation here is only quasi-linear in the security parameter. For the LWE instantiation, the computation is quasi-quadratic.
Correctness and Performance of FHE.Refresh
FHE.Refresh consists of two steps: Switch Keys and Switch Moduli. We address each of these steps in turn.
Correctness and Performance of the Switch-Key
Step. In the Switch Keys step, we take as input a ciphertext c under key s j for modulus qj and set c1 ← SwitchKey(τ s j →s j−1 , c, qj), a ciphertext under the key sj−1 for modulus qj. In Lemma 3, we proved the correctness of key switching and showed that the noise grows by the additive factor 2 BitDecomp(c, qj), e , where BitDecomp(c, qj) is a (short) bit-vector and e is a (short and fresh) noise vector with elements sampled from χ. In particular, if the noise originally had length B, then after the Switch Keys step it has length at most B+2·γR·Bχ·
· log qj is the dimension of BitDecomp(c, qj). We capture the correctness of the Switch-Key step in the following lemma. · log qj · dj and (assuming this noise length is less than qj/2) we have m = [e2]2.
The Switch-Key step involves multiplying the transpose of wj-dimensional vector BitDecomp(c, qj) with a wj × (nj + 1) matrix B. This computation isÕ(djn 3 j log 2 qj). Still this is quasi-linear in the RLWE instantiation.
Correctness and Performance of the Switch-Moduli
Step. The Switch Moduli step takes as input a ciphertext c1 under the secret bit-vector sj−1 for the modulus qj, and outputs the ciphertext c2 ← Scale(c1, qj, qj−1, 2), which we claim to be a ciphertext under key sj−1 for modulus qj−1. Note that sj−1 is a short secret key. By Corollary 1, and using the fact that 1(sj−1) ≤ (nj−1 + 1) · Bχ, the following is true: if the noise of c1 has length at most B < qj/2 − (qj/qj−1) · dj · γR · (nj−1 + 1) · Bχ, then correctness is preserved and the noise of c2 is bounded by (qj−1/qj) · B + dj · γR · (nj−1 + 1) · Bχ. Of course, the key feature of this step for our purposes is that switching moduli may reduce the length of the moduli when qj−1 < qj.
We capture the correctness of the Switch-Moduli step in the following lemma. The computation in the Switch-Moduli step isÕ(djnj−1 log qj).
Putting the Pieces Together: Parameters, Correctness, Performance
So far we have established that the scheme is correct, assuming that the noise does not wrap modulo qj or qj−1. Now we need to show that we can set the parameters of the scheme to ensure that such wrapping never occurs.
Our strategy for setting the parameters is to pick a "universal" bound B on the noise length, and then prove, for all j, that a valid ciphertext under key sj for modulus qj has noise length at most B. This bound B is quite small: polynomial in λ and log qL, where qL is the largest modulus in our ladder. It is clear that such a bound B holds for fresh ciphertexts output by FHE.Enc. (Recall the discussion from Section 3.1 where we explained that we use a noise distribution χ that is essentially independent of the modulus.) The remainder of the proof is by induction -i.e., we will show that if the bound holds for two ciphertexts c1, c2 at level j, our lemmas above imply that the bound also holds for the ciphertext c ← FHE.Mult(pk, c1, c2) at level j − 1. (FHE.Mult increases the noise strictly more in the worst-case than FHE.Add for any reasonable choice of parameters.) Specifically, after the first step of FHE.Mult (without the Refresh step), the noise has length at most γR ·B 2 . Then, we apply the SwitchKey function, which introduces an additive term η SwitchKey,j . Finally, we apply the Scale function. The noise is now at most
where η Scale,j is another additive term. Now we want to choose our parameters so that this bound is at most B.
Suppose we set our ladder of moduli and the bound B such that the following two properties hold:
• Property 1: B ≥ 2 · (η Scale,j + η SwitchKey,j ) for all j.
• Property 2: qj/qj−1 ≥ 2 · B · γR for all j.
Then we have (qj−1/qj) · γR · B 2 + η SwitchKey,j + η Scale,j
It only remains to set our ladder of moduli and B so that Properties 1 and 2 hold. Unfortunately, there is some circularity in Properties 1 and 2: qL depends on B, which depends on qL, albeit only polylogarithmically. However, it is easy to see that this circularity is not fatal. As a non-optimized example to illustrate this, set B = λ a · L b for very large constants a and b, and set qj ≈ 2 (j+1)·ω(log λ+log L) . If a and b are large enough, B dominates η Scale,L + η SwitchKey,L , which is polynomial in λ and log qL, and hence polynomial in λ and L (Property 1 is satisfied). Since qj/qj−1 is super-polynomial in both λ and L, it dominates 2 · B · γR (Property 2 is satisfied). In fact, it works fine to set qj as a modulus having (j + 1) · µ bits for some µ = θ(log λ + log L) with small hidden constant.
Overall, we have that qL, the largest modulus used in the system, is θ(L · (log λ + log L)) bits, and dL · nL must be approximately that number times λ for 2 λ security.
Theorem 3. For some µ = θ(log λ + log L), FHE is a correct L-leveled FHE scheme -specifically, it correctly evaluates circuits of depth L with Add and Mult gates over R2.
. For the LWE case (where d = 1), the per-gate computation isÕ(λ 3 · L 5 ). For the RLWE case (where n = 1), the per-gate computation isÕ(λ · L 3 ).
The bottom line is that we have a RLWE-based leveled FHE scheme with per-gate computation that is only quasilinear in the security parameter, albeit with somewhat high dependence on the number of levels in the circuit.
Let us pause at this point to reconsider the performance of previous FHE schemes in comparison to our new scheme. Specifically, as we discussed in the Introduction, in previous SWHE schemes, the ciphertext size is at leastÕ(λ · d
2 ), where d is the degree of the circuit being evaluated. One may view our new scheme as a very powerful SWHE scheme in which this dependence on degree has been replaced with a similar dependence on depth. (Recall the degree of a circuit may be exponential in its depth.) Since polynomial-size circuits have polynomial depth, which is certainly not true of degree, our scheme can efficiently evaluate arbitrary circuits without resorting to bootstrapping.
Security
The security of FHE follows by a standard hybrid argument from the security of E, the basic scheme described in Section 3.1. We omit the details.
OPTIMIZATIONS
Despite the fact that our new FHE scheme has per-gate computation only quasi-linear in the security parameter, we present several significant ways of optimizing it. We focus primarily on the RLWE-based scheme, since it is much more efficient.
Our first optimization is batching. Batching allows us to reduce the per-gate computation from quasi-linear in the security parameter to polylogarithmic. In more detail, we show that evaluating a function f homomorphically in parallel on = Ω(λ) blocks of encrypted data requires only polylogarithmically (in terms of the security parameter λ) more computation than evaluating f on the unencrypted data. (The overhead is still polynomial in the depth L of the circuit computing f .) Batching works essentially by packing multiple plaintexts into each ciphertext.
Next, we reintroduce bootstrapping as an optimization rather than a necessity (Section 6.2). Bootstrapping allows us to achieve per-gate computation quasi-quadratic in the security parameter, independent of the number levels in the circuit being evaluated.
In Section 6.3, we show that batching the bootstrapping function is a powerful combination. With this optimization, circuits whose levels mostly have width at least λ can be evaluated homomorphically with onlyÕ(λ) per-gate computation, independent of the number of levels.
Finally, Section 6.5 presents a few other miscellaneous optimizations.
Batching
Suppose we want to evaluate the same function f on blocks of encrypted data. (Or, similarly, suppose we want to evaluate the same encrypted function f on blocks of plaintext data.) Can we do this using less than times the computation needed to evaluate f on one block of data? Can we batch?
For example, consider a keyword search function that returns '1' if the keyword is present in the data and '0' if it is not. The keyword search function is mostly composed of a large number of equality tests that compare the target word w to all of the different subsequences of data; this is followed up by an OR of the equality test results. All of these equality tests involve running the same w-dependent function on different blocks of data. If we could batch these equality tests, it could significantly reduce the computation needed to perform keyword search homomorphically.
If we use bootstrapping as an optimization (see Section 6.2), then obviously we will be running the decryption function homomorphically on multiple blocks of data -namely, the multiple ciphertexts that need to be refreshed. Can we batch the bootstrapping function? If we could, then we might be able to drastically reduce the average per-gate cost of bootstrapping.
Smart and Vercauteren [21] were the first to rigorously analyze batching in the context of FHE. In particular, they observed that ideal-lattice-based (and RLWE-based) ciphertexts can have many plaintext slots, associated to the factorization of the plaintext space into algebraic ideals.
When we apply batching to our new RLWE-based FHE scheme, the results are pretty amazing. Evaluating f homomorphically on = Ω(λ) blocks of encrypted data requires only polylogarithmically (in terms of the security parameter λ) more computation than evaluating f on the unencrypted data. (The overhead is still polynomial in the depth L of the circuit computing f .) As we will see later, for circuits whose levels mostly have width at least λ, batching the bootstrapping function (i.e., batching homomorphic evaluation of the decryption function) allows us to reduce the per-gate computation of our bootstrapped scheme fromÕ(λ 2 ) toÕ(λ) (independent of L).
To make the exposition a bit simpler, in our RLWE-based instantiation where
(One could still use R2 as in [21] , but the number theory there is a bit more involved.)
Some Number Theory
Let us take a very brief tour of algebraic number theory. Suppose p is a prime number satisfying p = 1 mod 2d, and let a be a primitive 2d-th root of unity modulo p. Then, x d + 1 factors completely into linear polynomials modulo p -in particular,
In some sense, the converse of the above statement is also true, and this is the essence of reciprocitynamely, in the ring R = Z[x]/(x d + 1) the prime integer p is not actually prime, but rather it splits completely into prime ideals in R -i.e., p = d i=1 pi. The ideal pi equals (p, x − ai) -namely, the set of all R-elements that can be expressed as r1 ·p+r2 ·(x−ai) for some r1, r2 ∈ R. Each ideal pi has norm p -that is, roughly speaking, a 1/p fraction of R-elements are in pi, or, more formally, the p cosets 0+pi, . . . , (p−1)+pi partition R. These ideals are relative prime, and so they behave like relative prime integers. In particular, the Chinese Remainder Theorem applies:
Although the prime ideals {pi} are relatively prime, they are close siblings, and it is easy, in some sense, to switch from one to another. One fact that we will use (when we finally apply batching to bootstrapping) is that, for any i, j there is an automorphism σi→j over R that maps elements of pi to elements of pj. Specifically, σi→j works by mapping an R-element r = r(x) = r d−1
where eij is some odd number in [1, 2d] . Notice that this automorphism just permutes the coefficients of r and fixes the free coefficient. Notationally, we will use σi→j(v) to refer to the vector that results from applying σi→j coefficient-wise to v.
How Batching Works
Deploying batching inside our scheme FHE is quite straightforward. First, we pick a prime p = 1 mod 2d of size polynomial in the security parameter. (One should exist under the GRH.)
The next step is simply to recognize that our scheme FHE works just fine when we replace the original plaintext space R2 with Rp. There is nothing especially magical about the number 2. In the basic scheme E described in Section 3.1, E.PublicKeyGen(params, sk) is modified in the obvious way so that A · s = p · e rather than 2 · e. mod-p gates rather than boolean gates, and it is easy (if desired) to emulate boolean gates with mod-p gates -e.g., we can compute XOR(a, b) for a, b ∈ {0, 1} 2 using modp gates for any p as a + b − 2ab. For modulus switching, we use Scale(c1, qj, qj−1, p) rather than Scale(c1, qj, qj−1, 2). The larger rounding error from this new scaling procedure increases the noise slightly, but this additive noise is still polynomial in the security parameter and the number of levels, and thus is still consistent with our setting of parameters. In short, FHE can easily be adapted to work with a plaintext space Rp for p of polynomial size.
The final step is simply to recognize that, by the Chinese Remainder Theorem, evaluating an arithmetic circuit over Rp on input x ∈ R n p implicitly evaluates, for each i, the same arithmetic circuit over Rp i on input x projected down to R n p i . The evaluations modulo the various prime ideals do not "mix" or interact with each other. When ≥ λ, the per-gate computation is only polylogarithmic in the security parameter (still cubic in L).
Bootstrapping as an Optimization
Bootstrapping is no longer strictly necessary to achieve leveled FHE. However, in some settings, it may have some advantages:
• Performance: The per-gate computation is independent of the depth of the circuit being evaluated.
• Flexibility: Assuming circular security, a bootstrapped scheme can perform homomorphic evaluations indefinitely without needing to specify in advance, during Setup, a bound on the number of circuit levels.
• Memory: Bootstrapping permits short ciphertextse.g., encrypted using AES other space-efficient cryptosystem -to be de-compressed to longer ciphertexts that permit homomorphic operations. Bootstrapping thus allows us to save memory by storing data encrypted in the compressed form, while retaining the ability to perform homomorphic operations.
Here, we revisit bootstrapping, viewing it as an optimization rather than a necessity. We also reconsider the scheme FHE that we described in Section 3, viewing the scheme not as an end in itself, but rather as a very powerful SWHE whose performance degrades polynomially in the depth of the circuit being evaluated, as opposed to previous SWHE schemes whose performance degrades polynomially in the degree. In particular, we analyze how efficiently it can evaluate its decryption function, as needed to bootstrap. Not surprisingly, our faster SWHE scheme can also bootstrap faster. The decryption function has only logarithmic depth and can be evaluated homomorphically in time quasi-quadratic in the security parameter (for the RLWE instantiation), giving a bootstrapped scheme with quasi-quadratic per-gate computation overall.
Decryption as a Circuit of Quasi-Linear Size and Logarithmic Depth
Recall that the decryption function is m = [[ c, s ]q]2. Suppose that we are given the "bits" (elements in R2) of s as input, and we want to compute [[ c, s ]q]2 using an arithmetic circuit that has Add and Mult gates over R2. (When we bootstrap, of course we are given the bits of s in encrypted form.) Note that we will run the decryption function homomorphically on level-0 ciphertexts -i.e., when q is small, only polynomial in the security parameter. What is the complexity of this circuit? Most importantly for our purposes, what is its depth and size? The answer is that we can perform decryption withÕ(λ) computation and O(log λ) depth. Thus, in the RLWE instantiation, we can evaluate the decryption function homomorphically using our new scheme with quasi-quadratic computation. (For the LWE instantiation, the bootstrapping computation is quasi-quartic.)
First, let us consider the LWE case, where c and s are ndimensional integer vectors. Obviously, each product c[i]·s [i] can be written as the sum of at most log q "shifts" of s [i] . These horizontal shifts of s[i] use at most 2 log q columns. Thus, c, s can be written as the sum of n · log q numbers, where each number has 2 log q digits. As discussed in [8] , we can use the three-for-two trick, which takes as input three numbers in binary (of arbitrary length) and outputs (using constant depth) two binary numbers with the same sum. Thus, with O(log(n · log q)) = O(log n + log log q) depth and O(n log 2 q) computation, we obtain two numbers with the desired sum, each having O(log n + log q) bits. We can sum the final two numbers with O(log log n + log log q) depth and O(log n + log q) computation. So far, we have used depth O(log n + log log q) and O(n log 2 q) computation to compute c, s . Reducing this value modulo q is an operation akin to division, for which there are circuits of size polylog(q) and depth log log q. Finally, reducing modulo 2 just involves dropping the most significant bits. Overall, since we are interested only in the case where log q = O(log λ), we have that decryption requiresÕ(λ) computation and depth O(log λ).
When we evaluate decryption homomorphically in our RLWE-based scheme, we can use the R2 plaintext space to emulate the simpler plaintext space Z2. Using Z2, the analysis is basically the same as above, except that we mention that the DFT is used to multiply the R-elements that compose the ciphertexts. We note that we can use the techniques of Section 4 to make the final ring dimension d0 completely independent of the depth needed to evaluate the decryption circuit. However, we could bootstrap even without this optimization, as the depth of decryption only grows logarithmically with d0 = dL, whereas the number of levels that can be evaluated grows linearly with dL.
In practice, one would want to tighten up this analysis by reducing the polylogarithmic factors in the computation and the constants in the depth. Most likely this could be done by evaluating decryption using symmetric polynomials [8, 9] or with a variant of the "grade-school addition" approach used in the Gentry-Halevi implementation [10] .
Bootstrapping Lazily
Bootstrapping is rather expensive computationally. In particular, the cost of bootstrapping a ciphertext is greater than the cost of a homomorphic operation by approximately a factor of λ. This suggests the question: can we lower per-gate computation of a bootstrapped scheme by bootstrapping lazily -i.e., applying the refresh procedure only at a 1/L fraction of the circuit levels for some well-chosen L [11] ? Here we show that the answer is yes. By bootstrapping lazily for L = θ(log λ), we can lower the per-gate computation by a logarithmic factor.
Let us present this result somewhat abstractly. Suppose that the per-gate computation for a L-level no-bootstrapping
(We ignore logarithmic factors in f , since they will not affect the analysis, but one can imagine that they add a very small to the exponent.) Suppose that bootstrapping a ciphertext requires a c-depth circuit. Since we want to be capable of evaluating depth L after evaluating the c levels need to bootstrap a ciphertext, the bootstrapping procedure needs to begin with ciphertexts that can be used in a (c + L)-depth circuit. Consequently, let us say that the computation needed a bootstrap a cipher-
a quantity that we seek to minimize.
We have the following lemma.
for constants b1 > a1 and b2 > a2
, at some L = θ(log λ).
Proof. Clearly h(λ, L) = +∞ at L = 0, then it decreases toward a minimum, and finally it eventually increases again as L goes toward infinity. Thus, h(λ, L) has a minimum at some positive value of L. Since f (λ, L) is monotonically increasing (i.e., the derivative is positive), the minimum must occur where the derivative of
which becomes positive when L ≥ c/(b2 − 1) -i.e., the derivative is negative only when L = O(log λ). For L < (c − 1)/(b2 − 1), we have that the above derivative is less than −λ
, which dominates the positive derivative of f . Therefore, for large enough value of λ, the value h(λ, L) has its minimum at some
This lemma basically says that, since homomorphic decryption takes θ(log λ) levels and its cost is super-linear and dominates that of normal homomorphic operations (FHE.Add and FHE.Mult), it makes sense to bootstrap lazily -in particular, once every θ(log λ) levels. (If one bootstrapped even more lazily than this, the super-linear cost of bootstrapping begins to ensure that the (amortized) per-gate cost of bootstrapping alone is increasing.) It is easy to see that, since the per-gate computation is dominated by bootstrapping, bootstrapping lazily every θ(log λ) levels reduces the pergate computation by a factor of θ(log λ).
Batching the Bootstrapping Operation
Suppose that we are evaluating a circuit homomorphically, that we are currently at a level in the circuit that has at least d gates (where d is the dimension of our ring), and that we want to bootstrap (refresh) all of the ciphertexts corresponding to the respective wires at that level. That is, we want to homomorphically evaluate the decryption function at least d times in parallel. This seems like an ideal place to apply batching.
However, there are some nontrivial problems. In Section 6.1, our focus was rather limited. For example, we did not consider whether homomorphic operations could continue after the batched computation. Indeed, at first glance, it would appear that homomorphic operations cannot continue, since, after batching, the encrypted data is partitioned into non-interacting relatively-prime plaintext slots, whereas the whole point of homomorphic encryption is that the encrypted data can interact (within a common plaintext slot). Similarly, we did not consider homomorphic operations before the batched computation. Somehow, we need the input to the batched computation to come pre-partitioned into the different plaintext slots.
What we need are Pack and Unpack functions that allow the batching procedure to interface with "normal" homomorphic operations. One may think of the Pack and Unpack functions as an on-ramp to and an exit-ramp from the "fast lane" of batching. Let us say that normal homomorphic operations will always use the plaintext slot Rp 1 . Roughly, the Pack function should take a bunch of ciphertexts c1, . . . , Here, we describe suitable Pack and Unpack functions. These functions will make heavy use of the automorphisms σi→j over R that map elements of pi to elements of pj. (See Section 6.1.1.) We note that Smart and Vercauteren [21] used these automorphisms to construct something similar to our Pack function (though for unpacking they resorted to bootstrapping). We also note that Lyubashevsky, Peikert and Regev [14] used these automorphisms to permute the ideal factors qi of the modulus q, which was an essential tool toward their proof of the pseudorandomness of RLWE.
Toward Pack and Unpack procedures, we begin with the observation that if m is encoded as a number in {0, . . . , p−1}
That is, we can switch the plaintext slot but leave the decrypted message unchanged by applying the same automorphism to the ciphertext and the secret key. (These facts follow from the fact that σi→j is a homomorphism, that it maps elements of pi to elements of pj, and that it fixes integers.) Of course, then we have a problem: the ciphertext is now under a different key, whereas we may want the ciphertext to be under the same key as other ciphertexts. To get the ciphertexts to be back under the same key, we simply use the SwitchKey algorithm to switch all of the ciphertexts to a new common key.
Some technical remarks before we describe Pack / Unpack more formally: We mention again that E.PublicKeyGen is modified in the obvious way so that A · s = p · e rather than 2·e, and that this modification induces a similar modification in SwitchKeyGen. Also, let u ∈ R be a short element such that u ∈ 1 + p1 and u ∈ pj for all j = 1. It is obvious that such a u with coefficients in (−p/2, p/2] can be computed efficiently by first picking any element u such that u ∈ 1+p1 and u ∈ pj for all j = 1, and then reducing the coefficients of u modulo p.
Splicing the Pack and Unpack procedures into our scheme FHE is tedious but pretty straightforward. Although these procedures introduce many more encrypted secret keys, this does not cause a circular security problem as long as the chain of encrypted secret keys is acyclic; then the standard hybrid argument applies. After applying Pack or Unpack, one may apply modulus reduction to reduce the noise back down to normal.
More Fun with Funky Plaintext Spaces
In some cases, it might be nice to have a plaintext space isomorphic to Zp for some large prime p -e.g., one exponential in the security parameter. So far, we have been using Rp as our plaintext space, and (due to the rounding step in modulus switching) the size of the noise after modulus switching is proportional to p. When p is exponential, our previous approach for handling the noise (which keeps the magnitude of the noise polynomial in λ) obviously breaks down.
To get a plaintext space isomorphic to Zp that works for exponential p, we need a new approach. Instead of using an integer modulus, we will use an ideal modulus I (an ideal of R) whose norm is some large prime p, but such that we have a basis BI of I that is very short -e.g. BI = O(poly(d) · p 1/d ). Using an ideal plaintext space forces us to modify the modulus switching technique nontrivially. Originally, when our plaintext space was R2, each of the moduli in our "ladder" was odd -that is, they were all congruent to each other modulo 2 and relatively prime to 2. Similarly, we will have to choose each of the moduli in our new ladder so that they are all congruent to each other modulo I and relatively prime to I. (This just seems necessary to get the scaling to work, as the reader will see shortly.) This presents a difficulty, since we wanted the norm of I to be large -e.g., exponential in the security parameter. If we choose our moduli qj to be integers, then we have that the integer qj+1 −qj ∈ I -in particular, qj+1 −qj is a multiple of I's norm, implying that the qj's are exponential in the security parameter. Having such large qj's does not work well in our scheme, since the underlying lattice problems becomes easy when qj/B is exponential in d where B is a bound of the noise distribution of fresh ciphertexts, and since we need B to remain quite small for our new noise management approach to work effectively. So, instead, our ladder of moduli will also consist of ideals -in particular, principle ideals (qj) generated by an element of qj ∈ R. Specifically, it is easy to generate a ladder of qj's that are all congruent to 1 moduli I by sampling appropriately-sized elements qj of the coset 1 + I (using our short basis of I), and testing whether the principal ideal (qj) generated by the element has appropriate norm. Now, let us reconsider modulus switching in light of the fact that our moduli are now principal ideals. We need an analogue of Lemma 4 that works for ideal moduli.
Let us build up some notation and concepts that we will need in our new lemma. Let Pq be the half-open parallelepiped associated to the rotation basis of q ∈ R. The rotation basis Bq of q is the d-dimensional basis formed by the coefficient vectors of the polynomials x i q(x) mod f (x) for i ∈ [0, d − 1]. The associated parallelepiped is Pq = { zi · bi : bi ∈ Bq, zi ∈ [−1/2, 1/2)}. We need two concepts associated to this parallelepiped. First, we will still use the notation [a]q, but where q is now an R-element rather than integer. This notation refers to a reduced modulo the rotation basis Bq of q -i.e., the element [a]q such that [a]q − a ∈ qR and [a]q ∈ Pq. Next, we need notions of the inner radius rq,in and outer radius rq,out of Pq -that is, the largest radius of a ball that is circumscribed by Pq, and the smallest radius of a ball that circumscribes Pq. It is possible to choose q so that the ratio rq,out/rq,in is poly(d). For example, this is true when q is an integer. More generally, if q is sampled uniformly from a ball of radius R with center T · e1 for T R, so that q's coefficient vector is "almost parallel" to e1, one can show (for appropriate values of R and T ) that rq,out/rq,in will be poly(d). Choosing q in such a manner, one can also ensure that q −1 = 1/ q up to a poly(d) factor. ( q −1 refers to the Euclidean norm of the coefficient vector of the inverse of q in the overlying field Q(x)/f (x).) For convenience, let α(d) be a polynomial such that q −1 = 1/ q up to a α(d) factor and moreover rq,out/rq,in is at most α(d) with overwhelming probability. For such an α, we say q is α-good.
Of course, not every (not even a high proportion) of primes are the norm of a principal ideal generated by an α-good q ∈ R. But there many such primes, and that may suffice for many applications.
Below, we will also use r B,out to denote the outer radius associated to the parallelepiped determined by basis B.
Lemma 11. Let q1 and q2, q1 < q2 , be two α-good elements of R. Let BI be a short basis (with outer radius r B I ,out ) of an ideal I of R such that q1 − q2 ∈ I. Let c be an integer vector and c ← Scale(c, q2, q1, I) -that is, c is an R-element at most 2r B I ,out distant from (q1/q2) · c such that c − c ∈ I. Then, for any s with With this extension of modulus switching, we can use plaintext spaces that are very large (exponential in the security parameter) and that have properties that are often desirable (such as being isomorphic to a large prime field).
Other Optimizations
If one is willing to assume circular security, the keys {sj} may all be the same, thereby permitting a public key of size independent of L.
While it is not necessary, squashing may still be a useful optimization in practice, as it can be used to lower the depth of the decryption function, thereby reducing the size of the largest modulus needed in the scheme, which may improve efficiency.
SUMMARY AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Our RLWE-based FHE scheme without bootstrapping requires onlyÕ(λ · L 3 ) per-gate computation where L is the depth of the circuit being evaluated, while the bootstrapped version has onlyÕ(λ 2 ) per-gate computation. For circuits of width Ω(λ), we can use batching to reduce the per-gate computation of the bootstrapped version by another factor of λ. In follow-on work, Gentry, Halevi and Smart [?] show that the per-gate overhead can be further reduced to polylogarithmic in the security parameter.
While these schemes should perform significantly better than previous FHE schemes, we caution that the polylogarithmic factors in the per-gate computation are large. One
